Chapter

Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?

Richard Joyce

in Essays in Moral Skepticism

Published in print January 2016 | ISBN: 9780198754879
Published online March 2016 | e-ISBN: 9780191819865 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754879.003.0011
Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?

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Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this essay) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (such as an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims, and must be tested as such. This chapter does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (for example, what is meant by “objective”?—what is meant by “experience”?).

Keywords: empirical philosophy; moral objectivity; moral psychology; projectivism; experience

Chapter.  12772 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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