Chapter

The Phenomenal Field

Tim Bayne

in The Unity of Consciousness

Published in print October 2010 | ISBN: 9780199215386
Published online January 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191594786 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215386.003.0001
The Phenomenal Field

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There are many things that might be meant by ‘the unity of consciousness.’ According to some conceptions of the unity of consciousness the claim that consciousness is necessarily unified is clearly implausible; according to others the claim that consciousness is necessarily unified is well‐night trivial. The main business of this chapter is to identify a conception of the unity of consciousness according to which the claim that consciousness is necessarily unified is substantive, plausible, and of some interest. The conception of the unity of consciousness that is advanced holds that what it is for a subject of experience to have a unified consciousness is for each of their conscious states to be phenomenally unified with each other. This conception of the unity of consciousness gives rise to the unity thesis, according to which any conscious creature must have a unified consciousness.

Keywords: phenomenal field; object unity; subject unity; co‐consciousness; phenomenal unity; unity thesis

Chapter.  8054 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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