Framing effects and rationality

Shlomi Sher and Craig R. M. McKenzie

in The Probabilistic Mind:

Published in print March 2008 | ISBN: 9780199216093
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191695971 | DOI:
Framing effects and rationality

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This chapter demonstrates how the pragmatics of natural language can explain many apparent biases of ‘framing’ in reasoning. It explains that the way in which a problem is expressed carries a great deal of information, e.g. about underlying beliefs and values — and that these influence reasoners in systematic ways, although the formulation of a problem has typically been viewed as irrelevant to its solution. Thus, many ‘framing effects’ may arise, in part, because of the inadequacy of normative models that ignore the crucial informational differences between frames.

Keywords: reasoning; natural language; rationality; framing effects

Chapter.  9087 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Cognitive Psychology

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