Chapter

Trinity Monotheism

Daniel Howard-Snyder

in Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity

Published in print October 2009 | ISBN: 9780199216215
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191695995 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216215.003.0006
Trinity Monotheism

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This chapter formulates several criticisms of the analogies of Social Trinitarianism, particularly Craig's. It questions whether there could even be such a thing as Cerberus at all. It argues that because Social Trinitarianism's ‘whole’ Triune God is not, strictly speaking, a person, God cannot perform the intentional actions of creation and redemption. Because God is not a person, God cannot know, choose, or act at all. It concludes that such a God cannot be considered worship-worthy. It contends that genuine monotheism holds that there is one God, that something can be a God without exemplifying the property of being triune and that nothing can be a God without exemplifying a nature that includes the property of being a person.

Keywords: Trinity monotheism; polytheism; Craig; Triune God; person

Chapter.  14268 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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