Chapter

The Preferences of Insiders and Outsiders: Testing the Model's Assumptions about Individual Interests

David Rueda

in Social Democracy Inside Out

Published in print October 2007 | ISBN: 9780199216352
Published online January 2008 | e-ISBN: 9780191712241 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216352.003.0003
The Preferences of Insiders and Outsiders: Testing the Model's Assumptions about Individual Interests

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This chapter has two main goals: to produce data that provide a complete picture of the preferences of insiders, outsiders, and upscale groups; and to test whether these preferences fit into the partisanship model proposed in this book. The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a brief explanation of the survey used in the analysis and the way insiders, outsiders, and upscale groups have been categorized. The second section offers a detailed explanation of the individual preferences implied in the insider-outsider model and an initial and descriptive assessment of their accuracy. The third section contains a systematic multilevel analysis of the individual preferences of insiders, outsiders, and upscale groups. The fourth section introduces the two macro factors which, in Chapter 2, were hypothesized to affect the differences between insiders and outsiders: job security and corporatism. The final section presents multilevel maximum likelihood models estimating the effects of job security and corporatism. The results corroborate the model's claims: lower levels of employment protection do indeed make insiders more like outsiders (i.e., more supportive of labour market policy). The results support an economic insider-outsider interpretation of the effects of corporatism on insider preferences.

Keywords: insider-outsider model; upscale groups; individual preferences; job security; corporatism; multilevel maximum likelihood models; labour market policy

Chapter.  11790 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Comparative Politics

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