The Self as an Emergent Substance

E. J. Lowe

in Personal Agency

Published in print September 2008 | ISBN: 9780199217144
Published online January 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191712418 | DOI:
 The Self as an Emergent Substance

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This chapter explains why traditional arguments in favour of substance dualism are avoided in this book. In their place a new argument is presented which, however, supports only a non-Cartesian version of this view, according to which beings like ourselves — persons or, more generally, subjects of experience — are bearers of both psychological and physical properties, while nonetheless being distinct from our biological bodies and any parts of them. It is then explained why this view is well-suited to accommodating the dualistic psychophysical interactionism defended in the earlier chapters. The chapter concludes with a new and intuitively compelling argument against physicalist theories of mind. This completes Part I of the book.

Keywords: emergentism; interactionism; persons; physicalism; substance dualism

Chapter.  12172 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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