Chapter

Substance Causation, Persons, and Free Will

E. J. Lowe

in Personal Agency

Published in print September 2008 | ISBN: 9780199217144
Published online January 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191712418 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.003.0009
 Substance Causation, Persons, and Free Will

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This chapter more fully explains why all causation is fundamentally substance causation — that is, causation by ‘individual substances’, or persisting, concrete objects — rather than causation by events. It is then explained how the versions of substance dualism in the philosophy of mind and libertarianism in the philosophy of action that are defended in the book can be very naturally accommodated within a view of the physical world which takes seriously the fundamental status of substance causation.

Keywords: dualism; events; libertarianism; powers

Chapter.  8739 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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