Chapter

Rational Selves and Freedom of Action

E. J. Lowe

in Personal Agency

Published in print September 2008 | ISBN: 9780199217144
Published online January 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191712418 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.003.0010
 Rational Selves and Freedom of Action

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This chapter develops an externalist account of reasons for action in more detail against familiar objections raised against such accounts by internalists and advocates of event-causal theories of intentional action. A libertarian substance-causal approach to the problem of free will is defended in depth against the charges that it reduces free actions to mere chance events and provides no intelligible account of agential control. Finally, it is argued that we are rationally committed to the truth of a libertarian account of rational free action.

Keywords: causation; chance; choice; control; externalism; free will; intentional action; libertarianism; reasons for action

Chapter.  9039 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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