Chapter

Philosophical Skepticism and Externalist Epistemology

Ernest Sosa

in Reflective Knowledge

Published in print January 2009 | ISBN: 9780199217250
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191696053 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217250.003.0008
Philosophical Skepticism and Externalist Epistemology

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This chapter considers the following thesis and its supporting argument. Philosophical Skepticism: There is no way we could ever attain full philosophical understanding of our knowledge. The Radical Argument: (A1) Any theory of knowledge must be internalist or externalist. (A2) A fully general internalist theory is impossible. (A3) A fully general externalist theory is impossible. (C) Therefore, philosophical skepticism is true. It argues that there is no good reason to yield to the skeptic or to reject externalist theories of knowledge globally and antecedently as theories that could not possibly give us the kind of understanding of human knowledge in general that is a goal of epistemology. And so there is no good reason to accept philosophical skepticism, the main target thesis of this chapter.

Keywords: philosophical skepticism; Radical Argument; knowledge; internalist theory; externalist theory

Chapter.  7715 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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