Chapter

Truth as One

Michael P. Lynch

in Truth as One and Many

Published in print March 2009 | ISBN: 9780199218738
Published online May 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191711794 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218738.003.0003
 Truth as One

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This chapter examines and criticizes the two most plausible traditional theories of truth: the correspondence and pragmatist/coherence accounts. Traditional theories of this sort are species of alethic monism: the view that there is one and only one way for beliefs to be true. Particular attention is paid to developing the most plausible versions of either view. It is argued such theories are plausible when applied to some particular kinds of beliefs, but face insurmountable objections when applied to every kind of belief.

Keywords: correspondence theory; coherence theory; superwarrant; representationalism; antirepresentationalism; pragmatism; alethic monism

Chapter.  10650 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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