Truth as Many

Michael P. Lynch

in Truth as One and Many

Published in print March 2009 | ISBN: 9780199218738
Published online May 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191711794 | DOI:
 Truth as Many

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This chapter is concerned with the theory known as alethic pluralism: or the idea that there is more than one way for a belief or proposition to be true. Two versions of this idea are examined and ultimately rejected: the radical view that ‘true’ is simply ambiguous; and Crispin Wright's more plausible view that there is one concept of truth but many properties that satisfy that concept. The chapter raises a series of problems for both views, including so-called mixed inferences, mixed compounds, and the issue of the normativity of truth. The chapter concludes by summarizing the main lesson of the last two chapters, namely, that we need an account that allows us to understand truth as both many and one.

Keywords: pluralism; alethic pluralism; Crispin Wright; mixed inferences; mixed compounds; normativity of truth

Chapter.  6580 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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