Chapter

Deflationism and Explanation

Michael P. Lynch

in Truth as One and Many

Published in print March 2009 | ISBN: 9780199218738
Published online May 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191711794 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218738.003.0007
 Deflationism and Explanation

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What are the differences and similarities between deflationary views of truth and alethic functionalism? And why should we think that functionalism is the superior view? This chapter addresses these questions, arguing that functionalism has the significant advantage of keeping truth in our explanatory toolkit — it is compatible with the idea that understanding the nature of truth can help us understand other issues of philosophical importance.

Keywords: minimalism; explanatory value; alethic functionalism; nature of truth

Chapter.  8111 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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