Expanding the View: Semantic Functionalism

Michael P. Lynch

in Truth as One and Many

Published in print March 2009 | ISBN: 9780199218738
Published online May 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191711794 | DOI:
 Expanding the View: Semantic Functionalism

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This chapter argues that understanding truth as a functional property supports, but does not require, a broader semantic functionalism. This is the idea that other core semantic concepts — reference, content, meaning, and so on — are themselves functional in character, and therefore open to multiple manifestation. A sketch of how to understand such notions functionally is given.

Keywords: proposition; meaning; content; reference; denotation; belief; expressivism; quasi-realism

Chapter.  10130 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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