Chapter

Epistemic Nihilism

Terence Cuneo

in The Normative Web

Published in print September 2007 | ISBN: 9780199218837
Published online January 2008 | e-ISBN: 9780191711749 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0005
 Epistemic Nihilism

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Epistemic antirealist views are rarely explicitly formulated. This chapter formulates and engages with the epistemic counterpart to so-called error theories in morality, such as that defended by J. L. Mackie. Epistemic nihilism, as it is termed, is committed to the claim that there are no epistemic facts. It is argued that this type of view yields a radical type of scepticism, according to which there is no reason to believe the view itself or anything else, for that matter.

Keywords: antirealist views; error theory; J. L. Mackie; Moorean paradox; scepticism

Chapter.  3564 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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