Chapter

Epistemic Reductionism

Terence Cuneo

in The Normative Web

Published in print September 2007 | ISBN: 9780199218837
Published online January 2008 | e-ISBN: 9780191711749 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0008
 Epistemic Reductionism

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Reductionist views are the least radical of the antirealist camp. They maintain that there are moral facts, but deny that these facts are or generate categorical reasons. This chapter develops the epistemic counterpart to this view. It argues that while more plausible than more radical antirealist views, epistemic reductionism is incompatible with both externalist and internalist accounts of epistemic justification, and yields an unattractive version of epistemic relativism. These are important reasons for not accepting it.

Keywords: categorical reasons; reductionist views; externalism; internalism

Chapter.  17058 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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