Three Objections to the Core Argument

Terence Cuneo

in The Normative Web

Published in print September 2007 | ISBN: 9780199218837
Published online January 2008 | e-ISBN: 9780191711749 | DOI:
 Three Objections to the Core Argument

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This chapter addresses three objections that might be raised against what is argued in the preceding chapters. The first objection is directed toward the core argument's first premise. It maintains that the existence of epistemic facts should lead us to believe not that moral facts exist, but that the first premise of the core argument is false. The second objection concerns the core argument's second premise. It states that, even if the arguments in chapters four through seven are sound, we do not have better reason than not to believe that epistemic facts exist. Finally, the third objection rejects the core argument's fourth premise. It asserts that even if it is true that moral facts exist, we cannot conclude that moral realism is true, for the latter position is also composed of claims regarding the nature of moral discourse and truth. The chapter contends that these objections can be answered. In particular, it is argued that the price of accepting moral and epistemic realism is lower than that of accepting moral and epistemic antirealism.

Keywords: elimination; epistemic probability; externalism; mystery; moral facts; skepticism; truth

Chapter.  9841 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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