Chapter

Can we do Without Semantic Facts?

Anandi Hattiangadi

in Oughts and Thoughts

Published in print May 2007 | ISBN: 9780199219025
Published online September 2007 | e-ISBN: 9780191711879 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.003.0004
 Can we do Without Semantic Facts?

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This chapter explores Kripke's sceptical solution. Supposing that the sceptical argument is sound, what prospect is there for a sceptical solution, in other words one that embraces the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter to what we mean? It is argued that the ‘no fact thesis’ is irremediably incoherent, since, if semantic realism is rejected, no statement can be true or justified, even in the weakest sense. Thus, there is no hope for a ‘sceptical solution’ which purports to show that although semantic realism is false, our ascriptions of meaning and content are nevertheless legitimate. Since the appearance of a paradox in the sceptical conclusion cannot be resolved, the chapter provisionally concludes that the argument must falter somewhere.

Keywords: Kripke; sceptical solution; sceptical argument; sceptical conclusion; non-factualism; deflationism; meaning

Chapter.  17598 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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