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This chapter considers anti-reductionist theories and argues that each of those also fails. Anti-reductionists — who maintain that there are semantic facts over and above the causal, physical, and functional facts — seem equally unable to determine uniquely that I mean chicken pox rather than schicken pox by ‘chicken pox’. The problems that beset reductionists and anti-reductionists are different, but yield the same, unfortunate result.
Keywords: Kripke; anti-reductionist; capacities; intentions; norms; internal relations
Chapter. 11717 words.
Subjects: Philosophy of Language
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