Self-Rule and Procedural Justice


in Constitutional Goods

Published in print March 2007 | ISBN: 9780199225798
Published online January 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191706516 | DOI:
Self-Rule and Procedural Justice

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This chapter discusses the ways in which a government's duty under egalitarian public reason to provide conditions for self-rule is concretized within the liberal constitution. In particular, it discusses the changes (from the libertarian constitution) this duty makes to the individual's procedural rights in the trial and administrative processes; and it provides a theoretical account of the right to remain silent and of the administrative duty to act fairly. The chapter distinguishes the procedural consequences of the egalitarian principle regarded as constituent of liberal justice from those of the egalitarian principle regarded as fundamental. It argues that, while constituent egalitarianism produces procedures free persons could accept, fundamentalist egalitarianism does not. It also argues that, because it systematically disenfranchises particular interests, fundamentalist egalitarianism is incapable of producing institutions of representative government adequate to its own ideal of democratic self-rule.

Keywords: self-rule; trial process; right to silence; administrative process; fairness revolution; political representation

Chapter.  16612 words. 

Subjects: Constitutional and Administrative Law

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