in Constitutional Goods

Published in print March 2007 | ISBN: 9780199225798
Published online January 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191706516 | DOI:

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The chapter shows why it would be reasonable for a self-consistent adherent of each conception of public reason vying for control of the liberal constitution to adopt an inclusive conception within which each is contained as a constituent element. It argues that Rawls's burdens of judgment pose no obstacle to such a consensus. Further, it shows how the inclusive conception of public reason reconciles a perfectionist political order dedicated to an ideal of personality with a liberal one ordered to individual liberty and self-authorship. It suggests some implications of the inclusive conception for the debate between legal positivists and natural lawyers, while responding to concerns that a constitution ordered to the inclusive conception would mean the end of politics.

Keywords: perfectionism; convergent consensus; burdens of judgment

Chapter.  8192 words. 

Subjects: Constitutional and Administrative Law

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