Chapter

Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency

Fabian Dorsch

in Mental Actions

Published in print June 2009 | ISBN: 9780199225989
Published online February 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191710339 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989.003.0003
Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency

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What is the scope of our conscious mental agency, and how do we acquire self-knowledge of it? Both questions are addressed through an investigation of what best explains our ability to form judgemental thoughts in direct response to practical reasons. Contrary to what Williams and others have argued, it cannot be their subjection to a truth norm, given that our failure to adhere to such a norm need not undermine their status as judgemental. Instead, it is argued that we cannot form judgements at will because we subjectively experience them as responses to epistemic reasons, and because this is incompatible with our experiential awareness of direct mental actions, such as imagining. However, this latter awareness does not extend to indirect agency, which relies on epistemic or causal processes as means. Judging may therefore still count as an indirect action — just like, say, breaking a window by throwing a stone.

Keywords: judging; judgements; imagining; imagination; truth norm; mental agency; actions; self-knowledge

Chapter.  17646 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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