Freedom and Practical Judgement

David Owens

in Mental Actions

Published in print June 2009 | ISBN: 9780199225989
Published online February 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191710339 | DOI:
Freedom and Practical Judgement

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This chapter develops an intellectualist view of practical freedom according to which practical freedom is a capacity to act on our view of what we ought to do. It argues that this view is embodied in our judgements rather than our beliefs. Practical judgement is distinguished both from other truth directed phenomena like believing and guessing and also from non-truth directed states like imagining and intending. We make practical judgements where we are ignorant of what to do. We can also make and act on such judgements where we think we know what to do. This fact suggests a non-standard view of the value of knowledge. It also enables us to defend intellectualist accounts of practical freedom against voluntaristic alternatives.

Keywords: practical judgement; voluntarism; intellectualism; belief; value of knowledge; ignorance; will; freedom

Chapter.  9503 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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