Chapter

Mental Agency, Conscious Thinking, and Phenomenal Character

Matthew Soteriou

in Mental Actions

Published in print June 2009 | ISBN: 9780199225989
Published online February 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191710339 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989.003.0012
Mental Agency, Conscious Thinking, and Phenomenal Character

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This chapter focuses on the phenomenology of mental agency by addressing the question of the ontological category of the conscious mental acts an agent is aware of when engaged in such directed mental activities as conscious calculation and deliberation. An argument is offered for the claim that the mental acts in question must involve phenomenally conscious mental events that have temporal extension. The problem the chapter goes on to address is how to reconcile this line of thought with Geach's arguments for the claim that mental acts like judging lack temporal extension.

Keywords: mental agency; mental acts; calculation; deliberation; judging; Geach; temporal extension

Chapter.  11206 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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