Chapter

We're Right. They're Wrong

Peter Van Inwagen

in Disagreement

Published in print August 2010 | ISBN: 9780199226078
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191594236 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0002
We're Right. They're Wrong

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter introduces many of the central philosophical puzzles about peer disagreement. It starts with a discussion of disagreements in religion, and then extends the discussion to philosophical, political, and other disagreements. It assesses arguments for and against the skeptical view that the symmetry present in cases of peer disagreements makes suspension of judgment the appropriate attitude. The author of the chapter is unable to give up his beliefs in many of these cases and unable to accept the conclusion that his own beliefs are not rational, but is also unable to answer satisfactorily the arguments for the skeptical view.

Keywords: disagreement; peer disagreement; exclusivism; rationality

Chapter.  8106 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.