Chapter

Persistent Disagreement

Catherine Z. Elgin

in Disagreement

Published in print August 2010 | ISBN: 9780199226078
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191594236 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0004
Persistent Disagreement

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This chapter responds to arguments for the conclusion that participants in persistent peer disagreement ought to suspend judgment about the disputed proposition by noting that ‘ought implies can’ and that belief (and suspension of judgment) are typically not under the relevant kind of voluntary control. It is argued that issues about disagreement are better seen as being about acceptance rather than belief, and that continuing to accept propositions in the face of disagreement can have sufficient value to make it rational, and thus that peers can rationally accept conflicting propositions.

Keywords: disagreement; belief; acceptance; rationality; ought implies can; voluntary control

Chapter.  6343 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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