Chapter

Rational Disagreement Defended

Earl Conee

in Disagreement

Published in print August 2010 | ISBN: 9780199226078
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191594236 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0005
Rational Disagreement Defended

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This chapter formulates a rational uniqueness principle holding that those who are epistemic peers on a proposition, in that they know that they share all rational considerations concerning the truth of the proposition, cannot be justified in having different attitudes toward it. It then argues against the principle, primarily on the grounds that such peers may rationally regard themselves as differing in their basis for rational belief, or their evidence, on the topic. The rationality of their differing perspectives can justify having different attitudes toward the disputed proposition.

Keywords: disagreement; epistemic peers; rational uniqueness; evidence; rationality

Chapter.  9203 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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