Chapter

Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement

Alvin I. Goldman

in Disagreement

Published in print August 2010 | ISBN: 9780199226078
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191594236 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0009
Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement

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This chapter argues that there is a plausible though non-standard conception of epistemic relativism under which relativism is compatible with objectivism or absolutism. The key element of this conception is that people in different communities can justifiably accept different principles about reasoning. As a result, people with the same first-order (‘material’) evidence for a proposition can have divergent but reasonable attitudes toward it.

Keywords: disagreement; epistemic relativism; objectivism; principles of reasoning

Chapter.  11542 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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