The Moral Evil Demons

Ralph Wedgwood

in Disagreement

Published in print August 2010 | ISBN: 9780199226078
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191594236 | DOI:
The Moral Evil Demons

Show Summary Details


This chapter discusses moral disagreement and moral relativism, and places the long-standing discussion of these issues in the context of recent discussions of the epistemology of disagreement. It argues that it is rational to have a special sort of ‘fundamental trust’ in one's own moral intuitions, but it is not even possible to have the same sort of trust in the intuitions of others. As a result, it can be rational for both parties to a peer disagreement to have more confidence in their own views than in the incompatible views of their peers.

Keywords: moral disagreement; moral relativism; intuitions; self-trust; rationality

Chapter.  12915 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.