Chapter

The As Efficient Competitor Test

Renato Nazzini

in The Foundations of European Union Competition Law

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199226153
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191730856 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226153.003.0007

Series: Oxford Studies in European Law

The As Efficient Competitor Test

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This chapter is structured as follows. First, it examines the development of the as efficient competitor test in predation and, in particular, the cost benchmarks that are relevant to the application of the test. Next, it examines the extension of the test to margin squeeze, above-cost rebates, mixed bundling, and exclusivity. Then, it discusses discriminatory abuses as a further extension of the as efficient competitor test. In discrimination, the efficiency benchmark is not the dominant undertaking because the latter does not compete on the market where the anti-competitive effects occur. Rather, the efficiency benchmark is the undertakings benefiting from the discrimination. Discrimination is capable of affecting the ability to compete of firms that are as efficient as firms benefiting from the discrimination and are placed at a competitive disadvantage because of the dominant undertaking's conduct. Finally, conclusions are drawn.

Keywords: margin squeeze; above-cost rebates; mixed bundling; exclusivity; discriminatory abuses; efficiency; discrimination

Chapter.  17883 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: EU Law

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