Chapter

The Consumer Harm Test

Renato Nazzini

in The Foundations of European Union Competition Law

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199226153
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191730856 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226153.003.0008

Series: Oxford Studies in European Law

The Consumer Harm Test

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The consumer harm test asks whether the conduct of the dominant undertaking results in higher prices, lower output, or reduced product innovation. The test is not necessarily the manifestation of a consumer welfare objective of the competition rules but is consistent with the achievement of long-term social welfare. Therefore, the test may be applied under Article 102 even if this provision does not aim at maximizing some measure of consumer welfare but long-term social welfare. This chapter examines the consumer harm test in vertical foreclosure, focusing on refusal to supply and the margin squeeze. Next, it discusses the exploitative abuse test, which requires actual consumer harm. Then, it analyses the possibility that consumer harm may be the default test under Article 102 for practices that do not follow under other tests either directly or by analogy. Finally, conclusions are drawn.

Keywords: vertical foreclosure; refusal to supply; margin squeeze; exploitative abuse test; consumer harm; Article 102

Chapter.  17107 words. 

Subjects: EU Law

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