Chapter

The Two French Work‐Sharing Experiments: Employment and Productivity Effects

Francis Kramarz, Pierre Cahuc, Bruno Crépon, Oskar Nordstörm Skans, Thorsten Schank, Gijsbert van Lomwel and André Zylberberg

in Working Hours and Job Sharing in the EU and USA

Published in print February 2008 | ISBN: 9780199231027
Published online May 2008 | e-ISBN: 9780191710834 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231027.003.0010
The Two French Work‐Sharing Experiments: Employment and Productivity Effects

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter examines workweek reductions experiments in France. Using the 1982 workweek reduction, it is shown that work-sharing policies, per se, do not work. Put differently, they are not apt to work as long as wage subsidies are not offered to the firms. Their impact of employment and production is then shown using the experience of the experiment conducted at the end of the 1990s. Payroll tax subsidies (as well as other types of subsidies) mitigated the negative effects on employment of this last experiment. In the short run, firms that went to thirty-five hours benefited from the policy, in particular low-productivity firms (because payroll tax subsidies were disproportionately directed to them) to the detriment of firms that stayed at thirty-nine hours. Hence, in the short run, employment was redirected to low-productivity firms adopting the policy. Then, in the medium run, the breath of air coming from the subsidies stopped working and the firms that had moved to thirty-five hours started to fail massively, while the survivors appear to have benefited from these deaths.

Keywords: France; working hours; work-sharing policies; wage subsidies; Payroll tax

Chapter.  9254 words. 

Subjects: Public Economics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.