Chapter

Logical Necessity

David Pears

in Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy

Published in print September 2006 | ISBN: 9780199247707
Published online January 2007 | e-ISBN: 9780191714481 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247707.003.0004
 Logical Necessity

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Wittgenstein's anthropocentric treatment of logic is more difficult to accept, and even understand, than his anthropocentric treatment of the regular application of general words. There are also two further reasons for the greater difficulty of his account of logical necessity. One is that its Conventionalism, with its strong hint of artificiality, steals the limelight, while its Voluntarism, which has no such implication, stands behind it in the shadows and fails to cancel the implication of capriciousness. The other, more general, reason is that both his Conventionalism and his Voluntarism seem to be inconsistent with his rejection of all theorizing in philosophy. These two stumbling-blocks are connected in a way that will be explained, and their importance will be shown in the detailed exposition of his account of logical necessity.

Keywords: logic; word; Conventionalism; Voluntarism

Chapter.  13745 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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