Chapter

Some solutions

Brian Leftow

in God and Necessity

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199263356
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191741777 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263356.003.0003
Some solutions

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This chapter sets out four broad ways to handle the conflicts displayed by the Introduction. One might argue that necessary truths have no ontology. One might argue that the theist claims that the conflicts involve really have a restricted scope — that they say only that God is the source of (say) concrete things and that no concrete thing is co-eternal with Him. This would let one claim that necessary truths’ ontology falls outside this scope and again, the conflicts do not really arise. One might argue that necessary truths have only a ‘safe’ ontology — one that does not actually create the conflicts; safe ontologies considered include conventionalism, conceptualism, and non-divine powers theories. The last approach, which it recommends, is to bring God into the ontology of necessary truth.

Keywords: God; ontology; necessary; conventionalism; conceptualism; powers

Chapter.  13006 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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