Chapter

Why Meaning Intentions are Degenerate

Akeel Bilgrami

in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge

Published in print October 2012 | ISBN: 9780199278053
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745386 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0005
Why Meaning Intentions are Degenerate

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This chapter spells out what the normativity of intentions (and intentionality) consists in for Wittgenstein and then argues that the intentions that go into the production of meaning (for instance, in the production of meaningful linguistic speech) are degenerate forms of intention in which the normativity that, in general, holds of intentions, is missing. This has the effect, in turn, of undermining the assumption that meanings are normative. The argument makes central use (a) of the Gricean framework for relating meaning with intentions and (b) of the role of a Fregean notion of sense in our understanding of linguistic meaning.

Keywords: meaning; intention; normativity; rule-following; sense; truth-conditions; self-knowledge; Wittgenstein; Grice; Frege

Chapter.  18249 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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