Chapter

When Warrant Transmits<sup>*</sup>

James Pryor

in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge

Published in print October 2012 | ISBN: 9780199278053
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745386 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0011
When Warrant Transmits*

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The chapter takes issue with Wright’s diagnosis of Moore’s Proof of an external world. Wright maintains that the Proof exhibits a failure of transmitting warrant from the premise to the conclusion. The first concern of the chapter is to show that there is only one kind of transmission failure due to the fact that prior warrant for the conclusion of an argument is needed in order to have warrant for its premises in the first place. Hence, the dogmatist about perception, in order to make his case, needs only to show that the Proof does not fail to transmit warrant in this sense. The second part of the chapter argues for this idea by rejecting the idea that transmission failure would arise when warrant for the conclusion of an argument is required in order to be warranted in believing that one has warrant for the premises.

Keywords: conservatism; dogmatism; entitlement; Moore’s Proof; perceptual warrant; Principle of Closure; transmission failure; underminers

Chapter.  15025 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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