Wright on Moore<sup>*</sup>

José L. Zalabardo

in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge

Published in print October 2012 | ISBN: 9780199278053
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745386 | DOI:
Wright on Moore*

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To the sceptic’s contention that I don’t know that I have hands because I don’t know that there is an external world, the Moorean replies that I know that there is an external world because I know that I have hands. Crispin Wright has argued that the Moorean move is illegitimate, and has tried to block it by limiting the applicability of the principle of the transmission of knowledge by inference — the principle that recognizing the validity of an inference from known premises generates knowledge of the conclusion. This chapter argues that, in the presence of some plausible assumptions, blocking the Moorean move does not require limiting the applicability of the transmission principle. Then it argues against Jim Pryor’s contention that the Moorean argument transmits evidential support from its premises to its conclusion.

Keywords: scepticism; transmission; inference; neo-Mooreanism; Crispin Wright; evidential support

Chapter.  10454 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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