Chapter

Moore’s <i>Proof</i>, Liberals, and Conservatives – Is There a (Wittgensteinian) Third Way?<sup>*</sup>

Annalisa Coliva

in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge

Published in print October 2012 | ISBN: 9780199278053
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745386 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0013
Moore’s Proof, Liberals, and Conservatives – Is There a (Wittgensteinian) Third Way?*

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In this chapter a new, so-called ‘moderate’ conception of the architecture of empirical warrants is presented. The key aspect of the moderate position is that, contrary to Pryor’s ‘liberal’ one, collateral assumptions are needed in order for one’s current sense experience to constitute a justification for ordinary empirical beliefs. As opposed to Wright’s ‘conservative’ view, in contrast, moderatism does not require the existence of a justification for these collateral assumptions. This allows moderates to avoid trafficking in the dubious notion of entitlement — the kind of non-evidential warrant evoked by Wright in order to avoid the sceptical consequences of the conservative view. In closing, the bearing of moderatism on the cogency of Moore’s proof of an external world, on external world scepticism and its relationship with some of Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty are explored.

Keywords: empirical warrants; conservatives; liberals; moderatism; external world skepticism; Moore’s Proof; entitlements; Wright; Pryor; On Certainty

Chapter.  16537 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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