Training and Doctrine

Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly

in The Edwardian Army

Published in print May 2012 | ISBN: 9780199542789
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191741401 | DOI:
Training and Doctrine

Show Summary Details


This chapter examines in detail the British army's reactions to the South African War (1899–1902) and the Russo‐Japanese War (1904–5) and how they influenced training and the development of doctrine. It argues that the British army debated the meanings of these conflicts intensively but ultimately failed to develop a cohesive response. It explores the reasons behind this failure, including its concentration on imperial policing duties, small size, and limited vision, and inability to communicate ideas clearly across all ranks, particularly at a regimental level. It argues that although the top ranks of the army achieved a high degree of professionalism, the extent to which this permeated the whole army is much less certain.

Keywords: Firepower; South African War; Russo‐Japanese War; General Staff; training; Inspector‐General; musketry; cavalry; artillery; offensive; defensive; manoeuvres; training

Chapter.  23663 words. 

Subjects: Modern History (1700 to 1945)

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.