#### Preview

This chapter extends chapter 5's formal proof into a general discussion of how we should assess evidence — and, in particular, how we should test scientific theories — given the possibility that Everettian quantum mechanics is correct. The chapter proves — initially with informal arguments, but in due course with full mathematical rigor — that rational scientists should treat the branch weights assigned by quantum theory to quantum-mechanical branches exactly as if they were probabilities; as such, the chapter argues, probability is actually on firmer conceptual footing in quantum theory than in classical physics. After a brief digression to consider probability in approaches to quantum theory other than the Everett interpretation, the chapter concludes by placing the work in the broader context of recent work on Everett probability.

*Keywords: *
Everett interpretation;
many worlds;
probability in quantum theory;
statistical inference;
decision theory

*Chapter.*
*14620 words.*
*Illustrated.*

*Subjects: *
Philosophy of Science

Go to Oxford Scholarship Online » abstract

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.