Chapter

Rationality: Crossing the Fault Lines?

José Luis Bermúdez

in Decision Theory and Rationality

Published in print February 2009 | ISBN: 9780199548026
Published online May 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191720246 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548026.003.0006
 Rationality: Crossing the Fault Lines?

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This chapter explores the relation between the different dimensions of rationality. Previous chapters have argued that decision theory cannot be developed in a way that will satisfy the requirements of all three dimensions of rationality. This chapter assesses the prospects for taking decision theory to be a theory of rationality in just one of the three dimensions. It evaluates Pettit's claim that decision theory provides a normative canon of rationality, but not a deliberative calculus of rationality, as well as Kahneman and Tversky's proposal to use prospect theory as a explanatory-predictive complement to decision theory. The upshot of the chapter is that the three dimensions of rationality cannot be separated out.

Keywords: prospect theory; belief-desire law; folk psychology; reasoning heuristics; Pettit; Kahneman; Tversky

Chapter.  6963 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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