Chapter

The British Army of the Rhine's Doctrine for Nuclear War

David French

in Army, Empire, and Cold War

Published in print January 2012 | ISBN: 9780199548231
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191739224 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548231.003.0010
The British Army of the Rhine's Doctrine for Nuclear War

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter analyses the evolution of the army's doctrine for nuclear war fighting, from the moment when it first began to consider the possible impact of nuclear weapons on an army in the field in the late 1940s, to the point at which it had evolved a mature doctrine for such operations, in the late 1960s. It is a topic that has largely been ignored by historians of nuclear strategy, who have focused their attention on the adoption of the far more destructive strategic nuclear weapons. Such references as they have made to the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons have examined their impact on NATO's overall strategy, but little has been written about how the army considered they might be used, or the impact that their introduction had on how the army was configured and prepared for war.

Keywords: NATO; BAOR; tactical nuclear weapons; nuclear war‐fighting doctrine; military exercises; Flexible Response

Chapter.  10597 words. 

Subjects: Modern History (1700 to 1945)

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.