Chapter

The Army and the Withdrawal from East of Suez

David French

in Army, Empire, and Cold War

Published in print January 2012 | ISBN: 9780199548231
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191739224 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548231.003.0013
The Army and the Withdrawal from East of Suez

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This chapter examines the outcome of Sandys' promise that his reformed armed forces would reduce the burden of defence on the Exchequer. It then explores how a variety of political constraints began to limit how and where the British could commit ground forces beyond NATO. It shows how these factors interacted in the mid‐1960s to persuade the Wilson government that not only the economic but also the political cost of maintaining forces east of Suez had become too expensive. Finally, it analyses the ways in which the army was restructured in the second half of the 1960s to reflect the government's new defence priorities.

Keywords: defence spending; political constraints; Labour government and defence; Healey's reforms and the British army

Chapter.  18362 words. 

Subjects: Modern History (1700 to 1945)

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