Chapter

Justification

Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath

in Knowledge in an Uncertain World

Published in print November 2009 | ISBN: 9780199550623
Published online May 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780191722684 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.003.0005
Justification

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This chapter shows that the results reached in previous chapters about knowledge are true as well about justification for believing: if you are justified in believing p, then p is warranted enough to justify you in φ-ing, for all φ. The view is defended against challenges from two main camps: epistemological externalists and those who think that only what is known — and especially only what is true — can justify you in or be a reason you have for φ-ing. The chapter also defends the right-to-left direction of the conditional — if p is warranted enough to justify you in φ-ing, for all φ, then you are justified in believing p — paying special attention to the role that Wittgenstein's hinge propositions might play in an argument against it. The chapter closes with a discussion of recent principles suggested by John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley.

Keywords: justification; belief; epistemological externalists; John Hawthorne; Jason Stanley; hinge propositions; Wittgenstein

Chapter.  14923 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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