Chapter

Sensorimotor knowledge and the contents of experience

Julian Kiverstein

in Perception, Action, and Consciousness

Published in print August 2010 | ISBN: 9780199551118
Published online January 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191594960 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.003.0014
Sensorimotor knowledge and the contents of experience

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This chapter takes up an argument by Andy Clark according to which one lesson of research that purports to establish the existence of two-visual systems is that the content of experience must abstract away from the details of our sensorimotor engagement with the world. It argues for two ways in which sensorimotor knowledge might contribute to the contents of experience. Both contributions, however, are based on the assumption that our spatial point of view is reflected in the content of experience. It is the denial of this assumption that might be the basis of Clark's argument. His argument rests on the claim that, if visual experiences are to play the functional role assigned to the vision-for-perception system, the contents of those experiences must be independent of any spatial point of view. The chapter argues that experiences can be from a spatial point of view and play the functional role Clark assigns to them precisely because the contents of experience depend on a perceiver's sensorimotor knowledge.

Keywords: Andy Clark; sensorimotor knowledge; perception; action; two-visual systems; visual experience

Chapter.  12076 words. 

Subjects: Cognitive Psychology

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