Chapter

Indeterminism and Intelligibility

Helen Steward

in A Metaphysics for Freedom

Published in print March 2012 | ISBN: 9780199552054
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191738838 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552054.003.0006
Indeterminism and Intelligibility

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This chapter confronts the ‘Challenge from Chance’, which has always been the main difficulty faced by libertarianism. The problem is that it is difficult to see how the mere truth of indeterminism might make room for the kind of control over the future we feel we might not have if determinism is true—in some ways, indeed, indeterminism appears to make things even worse. In this chapter, it is argued, focusing in detail on Mele’s formulation of the problem of luck, that the libertarian should make an important concession to the compatibilist, and that having made it, the way is clear for a better understanding of the sorts of alternative possibilities which really are required for agency, and therefore, for freedom. The incompatibilism which results, it is argued, can meet the Challenge from Chance.

Keywords: Challenge from Chance; chance; libertarianism; indeterminism; control; determinism; Mele; luck; compatibilism; alternative possibilities

Chapter.  25093 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Metaphysics

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