Chapter

Integrity and Interaction

Christine M. Korsgaard

in Self-Constitution

Published in print March 2009 | ISBN: 9780199552795
Published online September 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780191720550 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552795.003.0009
 Integrity and Interaction

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If Platonic justice and the categorical imperative are constitutive principles of action, there must be a connection between moral goodness and having a unified soul. But one might object that these principles of unification are merely formal and do not lead to substantive moral commitments. Following Plato's comparison of the city and the soul, the objection is rephrased as one concerning the relationship between inward justice (between the parts of the city or the soul) and outward justice (between cities or souls). The chapter argues that it is impossible to interact with inwardly unjust people, and then examines the parallel problems that the inwardly unjust person has interacting with himself. It concludes that in order to interact with himself and others, an agent must treat his own reasons and those of others as being public or agent-neutral rather than private in their normative force, and so must respect humanity.

Keywords: humanity; identity; interaction; inward justice; Kant; outward justice; Plato; private; public; reason

Chapter.  14752 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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