Three <i>Prima Facie</i> Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199557912
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191743290 | DOI:
Three Prima Facie Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism

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This chapter delineates three interrelated prima facie problems for epistemological disjunctivism. The first is the concern that such a view will directly generate a kind of ‘McKinsey-style’ problem — i.e., a problem of a parallel sort to that which is widely alleged to face the combination of first-person authority and content externalism. The second problem concerns the fact that if one does have reflective access to factive reasons in cases involving paradigmatic perceptual knowledge, then it is hard to see how one can reconcile this claim with the undeniable truth that there are parallel introspectively indistinguishable scenarios in which one lacks a factive reason but where, nonetheless, one continues blamelessly to suppose that one possesses it. The third problem concerns the very idea of a factive reason providing epistemic support for knowledge.

Keywords: epistemological disjunctivist; rational support; perceptual knowledge; factive reason

Chapter.  1378 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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