Chapter

Seeing That <i>P</i> and Knowing That <i>P</i>

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199557912
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191743290 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0006
Seeing That P and Knowing That P

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This chapter argues that epistemological disjunctivism can evade the basis problem by resisting the conventional wisdom embodied by the entailment thesis. In particular, it maintains that one can capture the close connections between seeing that p and knowing that p without having to endorse the entailment thesis. It then further motivates the proposed alternative view by showing how this view can be embedded within a more sophisticated account of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases than that which is suggested by the entailment thesis. It is thus shown how rejecting the entailment thesis is a viable theoretical option for the proponent of epistemological disjunctivism. Hence, insofar as epistemological disjunctivism really does have the extensive theoretical advantages that it is said to have, then there is a solid theoretical basis to reject the entailment thesis and endorse in its place the alternative account of the relationship between seeing that p and knowing that p is offered.

Keywords: epistemological disjunctivism; entailment thesis; seeing; knowing

Chapter.  4175 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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