Chapter

Resolving the Access Problem

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199557912
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191743290 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0008
Resolving the Access Problem

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This chapter deals with the second of the three problems facing epistemological disjunctivism: the access problem. It starts by stating The Access Problem: (AP1) S can know by reflection alone that her reason for believing the specific empirical proposition p is the factive reason R. [Premise]; (AP2) S can know by reflection alone that R entails p. [Premise]; (APC) S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition p. [From (AP1), (AP2)]. It shows that the access problem for epistemological disjunctivism is neutralized since the problematic conclusion in question is never generated. Given that one of the other key prima facie problems for epistemological disjunctivism — the basis problem — is similarly ineffective, we are well on our way towards demonstrating that this proposal — and in particular, this proposal's endorsement of factive reflectively accessible reasons — has far more going for it than at first meets the eye.

Keywords: epistemological disjunctivism; access problem; factive reason; premise

Chapter.  2987 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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