Chapter

Relevant Alternatives and Closure

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199557912
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191743290 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0011
Relevant Alternatives and Closure

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This chapter begins with a discussion of the closure principle and the problem it poses for the relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge. It then turns to a new position known as contrastivism, which denies the closure principle. According to the contrastivist, knowledge is to be always understood contrastively, in the sense that one never knows that p simpliciter. Instead, one knows that p rather than each one of a set of contrasts (i.e., alternatives) to p, where knowing that a proposition obtains rather than one of the contrasts is explicitly understood in terms of discriminating the target proposition from the specified contrasts.

Keywords: closure principle; relevant alternative account; perceptual knowledge; contrastivism

Chapter.  1923 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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